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Paul M. Gardner 
D THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
Shannadean Dipo Christensen 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLAlTT'S BRIEF 
NO. 16615 
STATEMENT OF THE HATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for recovery of damages arising out 
of ~efendant's breach of an Option agreement for real property. 
::JISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was filed by Plaintiff on December 15, 1977 
to recover damages from Defendant for the breach of an Option 
agreement or in the alternative to compel Defendant to perform 
and convey title to the subject real property under the terms 
of an Ootion agreement entered into between one, Michael Heyrend, 
and the 'Jefendant on ~lay 18, 1977 which Option was subsequently 
assigned to Plaintiff and duly exercised by him on October 18, 
1977. On February 2, 1978 Plaintiff made a motion for permis-
sion to amend Plaintiff's complaint to delete its alternative 
claim for specific performance and for partial summary judgment 
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on the issue of liability. On March 16, 1978 the Honorable 
David K. Winder, Third District Court Judge, granted Plaintif: 
motion to amend Plaintiff's complaint and for partial sUlllI!lar.· 
judgment that Defendant had in fact breached the Option agree. 
ment and was liable to Plaintiff for all damages suffered by 
Plaintiff arising out of said breach. On March 27, 1979, t~ 
damage issue was tried to the Court, the Honorable Earnest L. 
Baldwin. Third District Court Judge presiding, and judgment 
was granted for the Plaintiff in the amount of $2,000.00, the 
amount which had been paid as consideration for the Option anc' 
which was to apply as a credit against the purchase price of 
the real property, and for interest at six percent and costs 
incurred by Plaintiff, but excluding all special damages in-
curred by Plaintiff as costs and expenses in preparation for 
exercise of the Option and excluding attorney's fees incurred 
by Plaintiff which were provided for under the terms of the 
Option agreement. From the judgment in favor of the Plainti'.: 
on the issue of damages the Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment on damages d 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff increasing the award of damage: 
as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial on the issue 
of damages. 
STATEMEllT OF FACTS 
The Option 
A written Option agreement was entered into between, one 
Michael Heyrend, and the Defendant on ~ay 13, 1977 for the P~ 
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chase of certain real property consisting of 2.63 acres of 
unimproved land located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Option agreement provided for the payment of the purchase 
price for the subject real property if exercised in the cash 
sum of $80,000.00 and at the time the Option was obtained, 
$1,000.00 was paid as consideration for the Option, which amount 
was to be applied to the purchase price if the Option was ex-
ercised. The Option was granted for a three month period and 
could be extended for an additional two month period upon pay-
ment of an additional $1,000.00 in consideration. The Option 
was subsequently extended two months to and including 
October 18, 1977 and an additional $1,000.00 of consideration 
was paid to extend the Option. This additional consideration 
also applied to the purchase price so that after applying 
the $2,000.00 paid for the Option, the remaining balance was 
$78,000.00, (R.5,6; Findings R.103,104). 
I1egotiations Prior to the Option 
The negotiations between Mr. Heyrend and Defendant for 
the Option agreement were conducted by one, David Helm, who 
was Hr. Heyrend's agent and who negotiated the relevant real 
property agreements on behalf of Mr. Heyrend. Prior to the date 
of execution of the Option agreement, Mr. Helm, on behalf of 
Mr. Heyrend, entered into negotiations with the Defendant and 
specifically advised the Defendant that Mr. Heyrend was inter-
ested in acquiring the Defendant's property in conjunction with 
an adjacent parcel of property owned by Mr. and Mrs. DeGooyer 
(hereinafter "DeGooyer's property"). Mr. Helm, further advised 
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Defendant that the DeGooyer' s property was necessary for acces; 
to Defendant's property and it was Mr. Heyrends intention to 
develop multiple family residences on the Defendant's propert:i 
and the DeGooyer's property combined (Findings R.104). 
During the negotiations, Mr. Helm first proposed to the 
Defendant that the Defendant enter into a sales agreement with 
~. Heyrend subject to the condition precedent that Mr. Heyrenc · 
be able to enter into a purchase agreement for the DeGooyer's 
property and further subject to the condition precedent that 
approval from Salt Lake County be obtained for the development 
of multiple family residences on the two properties combined. 
Defendant requested, however, that Mr. Heyrend first enter into 
an agreement to purchase the DeGooyer's property and then con-
tact Defendant again concerning the purchase of Defendant's 
property (Findings R.104). 
On May 11, 1977, shortly after the initial negotiations 
with Defendant, Mr. Heyrend entered into a written agreement 
to purchase the DeGooyer's property for the S'.lI!l of $53,000.00, 
subject to the express condition precedent that Mr. Heyrend be 
able to enter into a purchase agreement for the Defendant's 
property (Findings R.104). 
On May 13, 1977, shortly after ~r. Heyrend had entered 
into the agreement to purchase the DeGo~yer' s property, Mr· Hel~l 
again contacted the Defendant and met with the Defendant and ~­
attorney and advised them that Mr. Heyrend had entered into an 
agreement to purchase the DeGooyer's property and that it was 
conditioned upon Mr. P.eyrends being able to enter into an agr2e· 
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ment to purchase Defendant's property. He also discussed the 
proposed development on the two properties and said he would 
keep Defendant advised on the progress in obtaining Salt Lake 
County approval. The Defendant's attorney thereupon prepared 
the Option agreement and Defendant executed it (Findings R.105; 
R.146-148). 
During the Option Period 
On August 3, 1977, prior to the date the Option had to be 
exercised, Mr. Heyrend entered into an agreement to sell the 
DeGooyer's property and the Defendant's property and one addition-
al parcel of real property (a parcel adjoining the Defendant's 
property which Mr. Heyrend had entered into an agreement to pur-
chase) to Probe Construction Company, a Utah Corporation of which 
Plaintiff was the President and sole shareholder (Findings R.105). 
During the Option period, Mr. Heyrend caused to be prepared 
a site plan for the proposed development of the two properties with 
the necessary access for thirteen duplexes on Defendant's prop-
erty being provided over the DeGooyer's property. The site plan 
illustrated that the properties were combined and treated as 
being under common ownership. Certain expenses were paid for 
the engineering and preparation of the site plan in the amount 
of $415.54 (Findings R.105). 
During the period of the Option, Mr. Helm contacted 
Defendant on many occasions and advised Defendant of the progress 
on the approval from Salt Lake County for the planned development. 
Approval from Salt Lake County was obtained for the planned 
development and Mr. Helm met with Defendant during the Option 
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period and so advised her and showed her the site plan il-
lustrating the location of the office building proposed to 
be constructed on the DeGooyer's property and the thirteen 
duplexes proposed to be constructed on the Defendant's prop~· 
(Findings R.105, 106). 
On September 28, 1977, prior to the date the Option wit' 
Defendant was required to be exercised, Mr. Heyrend, relying 
upon the Option, entered into a new written agreement to pur-
chase the DeGooyer's property which agreement was not subject 
to the condition precedent that Mr. Heyrend be able to purcha: 
the Defendant's property and Mr. Heyrend paid a cash deposit 
as earnest money in the sum of $300.00. The closing date spec 
ified in the new agreement for the DeGooyer's property was 
October 27, 1977 which date was after the date Plaintiff gave 
notice to Defendant that he was exercising the Option and tha: 
he had acquired all of Mr. Heyrends interest in the Option 
(Findings R.106). 
On October 14, 1977, Mr. Ileyrend agreed with Plaintiff 
that Plaintiff's company, Probe Inc. , could assume :1r. Heyrends 
rights and interests in the purchase agreement for the DeGoove· 
property and in the Option for the Defendant's property to 
satisfy Mr. Heyrends obli.gation to sell those parcels of real 
property to Plaintiff's company under the written agreer.ient 
made on August 3, 1977. :1r. Heyrend also orally assigned all 
of his rights and interests in the contracts to purchase and ~ 
the same date executed a written assignment of the Ootion for 
the purpose of permitting the Plaintiff to exercise the Ootion 
directly (Findings R.106). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
In addition to the special expenses paid for engineering 
and site plan preparation for the Defendant's property and the 
DeGooyer's property combined, the Plaintiff also had an existing 
duplex plan and office building plan which had to be revised 
to satisfy the requirements of Salt Lake County's approval 
for the development. The Plaintiff paid $400.00 for the mod-
ification of the existing building plans. The modified plans 
were also used by Plaintiff to obtain a commitment for financing 
for the proposed development (R.180,182,183). 
Experts' Valuation of Property 
Expert testimony was admitted at trial to determine the 
fair market value of the Defendant's property upon the date 
Defendant breached the Option agreement, October 18, 1977. 
Experts for Plaintiff, testified that the value of Defendant's 
property was $114,600.00 if the Defendant's property was con-
sidered with the benefit of the access to Defendant's property 
over the adjoining DeGooyer's property under circumstances where 
the two properties were being acquired together, were under common 
ownership, or were being used in combination (the Court so 
found-Findings R.107; R.214,215,224,225). Plaintiff's expert 
testified that the value of Defendant's property was $81,339.00, 
when ~efendant's property was considered without the benef~t of 
the access over the DeGooyer's property (R.224). 
Plaintiff's experts testified that the lower value of 
Defendant's property when considered without any combination 
with the DeGooyer's property resulted from the absence of a 
sufficient access to the Defendant's property which did not front 
upon a public street. When the DeGooyer's property is acquired 
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together with the Defendant's property, the DeGooyer's prop-
erty serves as that principal access and therefore the value 
of Defendant's property is greatly enhanced by the combinatio: 
of the two properties (R.215,216,225). 
Expert testimony for Defendant was that the value of the 
Defendant's property on the date of breach was $80, 000. 00 wher. 
considering the property without the benefit of any combinatk' 
or joint acquisition of the Defendant's property with the 
DeGooyer's property (the Court so found-Findings R.107). De-
fendant's expert also testified that the detriment to Defendar:. 
property when considered alone, was that it did not have a 
sufficient access to it, and that the highest and best use for 
Defendant's property would be in combination with other prop-
erties so there would be a principal access and a combination 
or joint acquisition of the Defendant's property with the 
DeGooyer's property would make the value of the Jefendant's ~: 
erty substantially more (R.235,236). 
Upon receiving Defendant's experts testimony, the Court i 
conmiented that the whole issue in the case would be based on t: 
question of what was the appropriate measure of damages 
I 
(R.23:i 
The Court in its Conclusions of Law determined that the appro-
priate measure of damages was the value of the Defendant's pro: 
erty without considering any benefit from the access obtained 
1 
by combination or joint acquisition with the DeGooyer' s properd 
viz, $80,000.00 (the Option price), less the unpaid balance of 
I 
$78,000.00 for damages in the amount of $2,000.00, the conside: 
ation which was paid to Defendant for the Option and which was 
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to be applied to the purchase price if the Option was exercised 
(Conclusions-R.107). 
The Court further concluded Plaintiff was not entitled 
to recover the costs and expenses of engineering and preparation 
of a site plan for the proposed development since the loss 
of said costs and expenses did not directly result from Defend-
ants breach (Conclusions-R.107). 
The Court also said in its Conclusions of Law that Plaintiff 
was entitled to recover, as part of the damages, attorney's 
fees under the written terms of the Option agreement, but 
evidence of attorney's fees was not presented at trial and 
Plaintiff's motion made at the beginning of Plaintiff's closing 
argument to permit Plaintiff to offer evidence of attorney's 
fees was denied and therefore, the Court awarded no attorney's 
fees (Conclusions-R.108). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES MEASURED BY 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE DEFENDAHT'S PROPERTY UPON 
THE DATE OF BREACH LESS THE UNPAID BALANCE OF THE CON-
TRACT PRICE AND WITH THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY DETERMHIED BY CONSIDERI:~G THE BENEFIT OF THE JOINT 
ACQUISITION OR COMBElATION OF THE DEGOOYER' S PROPERTY 
AND THE DEFE:IDANT' S PROPERTY. 
Under Utah Law, the basic measure of damages for breach 
of an agreement to sell real property is the benefit of the 
bargain rule from ordinary contract law as stated in Beckstrom 
v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Ut. 1978): 
"The general rule as to damages in such circum-
stances is that where a vendor breaches his contract 
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to convey property, the vendee is entitled to the 
benefit of his bargain; that is, he is entitled to 
the market value of the property at the time he would 
be entitled to receive conveyance thereof, less the 
amount he agreed to pay." 578 P.2d at P.523. 
To the same effect are Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771 
(Ut. 1977); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Ut. 1962). 
It is important to note that this general rule of damag. 
for a vendors breach, i.e., the excess of fair market value 
over the balance of the purchase price, was not adopted to 
limit the vendee to less than the benefit of his bargain, bu: 
instead is expected to be the benefit of the vendee' s bargai: 
under usual circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court has em-
phasized time and time again, that it is t~e loss of the 
benefit of the bargain to the vendee that the Court is at-
tempting to measure and not mere rigid compliance with a 
formula that does not apply in all circumstances. Indeed 
in Beckstrom where Laub, the vendee, had bargained to purchas 
80 acres of real property from Vere, who owned O!lly a one-ha: 
interest in the property, the Court allowed Laub to retain 
forty acres, but reversed on the damages awarded which were 
in part based only on Laub's loss of his bargain on one-half 
of the property, the forty acres which Vere could not convey 
to him. The Court said; 
In view of our decision as set forth herein, that 
the Laubs are entitled to the benefit of their bargain 
as it would have been if Vere had oerformed on his 
contract, it is necessary that there be such a deter-
mi~ation and assessment of damages under the rule above 
stated. 578 P.2d 520 at P.523. 
It appears that the Supreme Courts intention in Beckstr~ 
was that Laub should receive damages for the entire benefit 
of his bargain which would be the value of the full 30 acres Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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combined and not merely the loss of the value of the 40 
acres he did not receive. Justice Ellett concurring in the 
unanimous opinion in Beckstrom commented as follows: 
I concur, but wish to state my opinion as to what 
the damages for the Laubs would be on retrial. 
I think the Laubs are entitled to the fair market 
value of the entire tract of land less the fair market 
value of the one-half interest awarded to them; 
also, less the $15,000 unpaid on the purchase contract. 
578 P.2d 520 at P.524. 
In this case the Plaintiff bargained for, and his direct 
purpose was, the joint acquisition of both the DeGooyer's 
property and the Defendant's property for the enhanced benefit 
of their combination by providing the necessary access to 
Defendant's property and for the specific purpose of an 
integrated development on both properties. In the initial 
negotiations, Defendant was specifically advised of these facts, 
and understood these circumstances both before and after the 
purchase agreement was entered into for the adjoining DeGooyer's 
property (which was conditioned upon the purchase of Defend-
ant's property). Only then was the Option agreement entered 
into with Defendant who was well informed and advised there-
after of every step taken and the benefit sought to be obtained. 
Under these special circumstances for the Court to dis-
regard the benefit of Plaintiff's bargain by merely awarding 
Plaintiff damages based on the fair market value of the Defend-
ant's sole property, without the benefit of the joint acquisi-
tion and combination known to Defendant prior to entering 
into the Option agreement, would be depriving Plaintiff of a 
substantial portion of the benefit of his bargain and would 
not be consistent with the measure of damages expressed by the 
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benefit of the bargain rule. 
The benefit of the bargain rule which undertakes to put 
the vendee in as good as position as he would have been in, 
had there been no breach by the vendor is not without limi-
tation. It is generally held that the vendor should not be 
required to pay damages based upon special benefits or circ~ 
stances known only to the vendee, and which would not be within 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties. However, it is 
also well settled that where special circtunstances cause 
additional damage to the innocent party, the breaching party 
will be held responsible for such damages if he was informed 
of such special circtunstances prior to the time the agreemen: 
was entered into so that it can be said that the possibility 
of such damages were within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of contract. 
In Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem· 
nity Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Ut. 1958), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The rule as to what damages are recoverable for 
breach of contract is based upon the concept of reason-
able foreseeability that loss of such general character 
would result from the breach. Therefore, to be comoen-
sable, the loss must result from the breach in the natur 
and usual course of events, so that it can fairly and 
reasonably be said that if the minds of the parties 
had adverted to breach when the contract was made, loss 
of such character would have been within their contem-
plation. 325 P.2d 906 at P.907: 
And in 22 Am. Jur. 62 at P.93, the authors state: 
Loss of profits growing out of an existing collater: 
or subordinate agreement may be recovered where, and onl· 
where, the possibility of profits was within the contem-
plation of the defaulting party when the original contrac 
was made and such profits are proved with reasonable 
certainty. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in a recent case involving 
the breach of a real estate option reiterated the above rules 
on measuring damages in distinguishing between general and 
special damages, Ranch Hornes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp. 
592 P.2d 620 (Ut. 1979). 
It is important to point out that the Plaintiff did not 
seek damages in the trial court measured by the loss of fair 
market value on the two parcels of property being treated as 
one, i.e., the DeGooyer's property and the Defendant's property, 
but instead sought only to have the damages measured by the 
fair market value of the Defendant's property without the 
detriment of inadequate access, or alternatively with the 
augmented or enhanced value to the Defendant's property by 
virtue of the Plaintiff's right to acquire the adjoining 
DeGooyer's property and use it to provide the necessary access. 
It was this benefit in combining the DeGooyer's property and 
the Defendant's property which the Plaintiff sought to have 
and which formed the very basis for the negotiations with the 
Defendant for the acquisition of Defendant's property and 
which benefit was specifically pointed out to the Defendant in 
a very direct and above-board manner during the negotiations 
prior to entering into the Option agreement. Therefore, the 
measure of damages advocated by Plaintiff falls more squarely 
within the general rule of damages than in the category of 
special damages although the result would be the same. 
The real estate experts all testified at trial that the 
highest and best use of the Defendant's property (indeed per-
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haps the only valuable use of Defendant's property), would 
be in conjunction with an adjoining property to provide 
appropriate access for the use and development of Defendant's 
property. The Utah Supreme Court has said in determining 
the fair market value of real property, that the Court should 
look to the highest and best use of the land, not the use 
being made of the land at the time of breach. Moyle v. S.L.C 
176 P.2d 882 (Ut. 1947); and the Court should take into con-
sideration all factors bearing upon the value of the property 
which a reasonable prudent purchaser would consider, includin: 
any potential development reasonably to be expected. State 
Road Cormn. v. Woolley, 390 P.2d 860 (Ut. 1964); State Road 
Cormn. v. Wood, 452 P.2d 872 (Ut. 1969). 1 
There can be little doubt that the Defendant's property 
had a higher value when purchased with the DeGooyer's propert; 
to provide for the necessary access to the Defendant's prop-
erty. The Defendant knew that the highest and best use of 
Defendant's property was in conjunction with the DeGooyer's 
property since Defendant attempted to purchase the DeGooyer's 
property by making a written offer to the 8eGooyers shortly 
after the date the Defendant breached the Option agreement 
(R.207,203). Therefore, in determining the value of Defendan: 
property for purposes of measuring the loss of Plaintiff's 
bargain, the value should be viewed from Plaintiff's position 
lAlthough most cases discussing how to value land are 
condemnation cases, the principles develooed in condem-
nation cases are applicable in determining the value in 
breach of contract actions. Reed v. Wadsworth, 
553 P. 2d 1024 (Uy. 1976). 
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in having existing contract rights to acquire the DeGooyer's 
property. This principal is set forth at 27 Am. Jur. 2d § 280: 
The fact that the most profitable use can be made 
only in ~onnection with other lands does not necessarily 
exclude it from cnsideration, if the possibility of 
such connection is reasonably sufficient to affect 
market value. 27 Am. Jur. 2d § 230 at P.72. 
This principal was applied in United States v. Jaramillo, 
190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951), a condemnation case, where the 
Defendant landowner in addition to owning the condemned 
land also held a grazing permit on adjacent Federal land. The 
Court held it was proper to take the value of the grazing 
permit into account in determining the market value of the 
condemned land under its highest and best use, i.e., a ranch. 
Also in United Statesv. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 35 L.Ed. 2d 16, 
93 S.Ct. 801 (1973), the Supreme Court stated: 
This court has held that generally the highest and 
best use of a parcel may be found to be a use in con-
junction with other parcels, and that any increment 
of value resulting from such combination may be taken 
into consideration in valuing the interest. 
To the same effect, see State Highway Comm. v. Bloom, 
94 N.W. 2d 572 (1958); Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. State Ex Rel 
Herman, 489 P.2d 299 (Ariz. 1971). 
In this case at the very outset of negotiations with 
Defendant for the purchase of Defendant's property the Defend-
ant was specifically advised that the intended use to be made 
of Defendant's property was for multiple family dwellings and 
that the only way that use and benefit could be realized was 
by purchasing the adjoining DeGooyer's property along with 
Defendant's property so access could be provided. The highest 
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and best use of Defendant's property was in this combination 
Defendant was first approached about entering into a pur-
chase agreement subject to the condition precedent that the 
purchase of the DeGooyer' s property be obtained. In fact, it 
was Defendant that recorrnnended that the purchase agreement fo· 
the DeGooyer's property be entered into first before Defendu: 
enter into an agreement to sell her property. Then 
after the purchase agreement for the DeGooyer's property had 
been entered into, Defendant was specifically advised that 
that agreement had been made and that is was conditioned 
upon Defendant's agreement to sell her property so that the 
contemplated multiple family development could be realized. 
Even after Defendant entered into the Option agreement, Defen: 
ant was continually advised about the progress of the approva. 
from Salt Lake County for the proposed development on the two 
properties combined and was shown a site plan illustrating fr 
proposed development on the properties. 
It would be difficult to imagine how Defendant could h~ 
been better informed as to what the potential loss and damage 
to Plaintiff would be if Defendant breached the Option agree-
ment. Indeed, it was only after Plaintiff realized that he 
could not continue to tie up the DeGooyer's property any 
longer after Defendants breach, tha: Plaintiff amended his 
complaint to claim only for damages for his loss and not alter 
atively for specific performance by Defendant. 
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Point II 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER SPECIAL DAMAGES FOR 
THE COSTS &'ID EXPENSES INCURRED IN RELIAtlCE UPON THE 
OPTION AGREEl1L·1T. 
During the five month Option period, Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's assignor, Mr. Heyrend, paid and incurred certain 
expenses in reasonable reliance upon the Option agreement and 
in preparation for obtaining approval from Salt Lake County 
for the proposed development on Defendant's property. 
The Court, in its Findings of Fact, found that certain 
expenses were paid in the amount of $415.54 for the engineering 
and preparation of a site plan illustrating the location 
of the proposed development on the properties. The Plaintiff 
also paid the sum of $400.00 for drafting services to modify 
an existing office building plan and duplex plan to meet the 
requirements of Salt Lake County in its approval of the pro-
posed development and for Plaintiff's use in obtaining fin-
ancing. The Court also found that a cash earnest money deposit 
in the sum of $300.00 was paid to the DeGooyers under the 
terms of the purchase agreement entered into on September 28, 
1977, and such sum was forfeited to the DeGooyers after Defend-
ant breached the Option agreement and the Plaintiff could not 
complete the purchase transaction. 
Despite the fact that the total amount of these special 
costs and expenses was only $1,115.54, and that they were out 
of pocket costs rendered useless directly by Defendants breach; 
nevertheless, the Court concluded that Plaintiff could not 
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recover these costs and expenses as special damages since 
the loss did not directly result from Defendant's breach 
(see Conclusions of Law, R.107). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ranch Hornes, Inc. v. Greater 
Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620 (Ut. 1979), a recent decision 
involving the breach of an Option agreement and an action 
for damages by the optionee-developer, stated the rule for 
special damages: 
The term "general damages", as applied to the 
instant case, denotes those damages which in the usual 
course of things flow from the breach. They are of 
course limited to those resulting from the ordinary 
and obvious purpose of the contract, which in the case 
at hand would be the "loss of bargain" represented 
by the difference between the market value of the land 
and the option price. On the other hand, the term 
"special damages" denotes those damages which arise 
from the special circumstances of the case. They have 
been said to be such damages as, by competent evidence, 
are directly traceable to failure to discharge a con-
tractual obligation. 
This Court has on numerous occasions noted the 
distinction between general and special damages and the 
applicability of each as a proper measure of damages. 
We again reiterate that, in addition to general damages. 
one is entitled to recover those special damages 
which arise from circumstances eculiar to a articular 
case, rovided the ma be reasonab su oosed to have 
been within the contem ation or the arties when the 
contract was ma e, an provide urther, that they are 
properly pleaded and proved. 
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the 
o tion a reement which is the sub"ect of this case, it 
is obvious the ver nature o such an a reernent that 
it was we 1 wit in the contern the contractin 
arties that certain re evant ex en itures ma be nec-
essary an require on t e part ot the optionee in.or er 
to determine the feasibility of exercising the option. 
592 P.2d 620 at P.624. (emphasis added). 
The Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. held specifically that 
such special damages consisting of out of pocket expenditures 
in reliance on the Option agreement are recoverable by Plain-
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tiff provided that such expenditures are found to have been 
reasonably made. The Court in striking down a portion of 
the damages awarded as being unreasonable expenditures drew 
a contrast between such excessive amounts and" ... reasonable 
costs of preparing a preliminary plat necessary to secure 
favorable zoning and financing and to estimate development 
costs." Id at P.625. 
In this case costs and expenses in the amount of $815.54 
were incurred directly in preparation of a preliminary site 
plan and modified building plan necessary for zoning approval 
and for financing, and although a modest sum, it was effective 
to secure favorable approval from Salt Lake County and approval 
of Plaintiff's financing. 
The earnest money deposit of $300.00 forfeited on the 
DeGooyer's purchase was directly lost as a result of Defend-
ants breach and the Defendant knew prior to entering into the 
Option agreement that the parties contemplated making efforts 
to obtain approval from Salt Lake County for the proposed 
multiple family development on Defendant's property and that 
the DeGooyer's property was only of value for the proposed 
development with the Defendant's property. Even prior to the 
date of exercising the Option and Defendants breach, the 
Defendant had been shown the site plan illustrating the pro-
posed development on her property combined with the DeGooyer's 
property and had been continually advised of the progress in 
obtaining approval from Salt Lake County for the development. 
The trial judges exclusion of these out of pocket costs 
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from the damage award was not based upon an error in the 
Findings of Fact with respect to the amounts expended, but 
was instead based upon an erroneous Conclusion of Law that 
Plaintiff was not entitled to these special damages as not 
directly resulting from Defendants breach. This conclusion 
is certainly not consistent with the Utah Supreme Courts pro. 
nouncer:ient in Ranch Homes, Inc. 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO PUT ON EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The written Option agreement executed by Defendant pro-
vided that in the event of Defendants breach, that the Defend-
ant would be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees. \Jhe: 
a written contract or instrument has provision for reasonable 
attorney's fees then an award of such fees becomes an element 
of damages and the Court is required to award fees, although 
the amount of such award will rest within the discretion of 
the trial court, see Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771 (Ut. 1977). 
In this case, the Court concluded that Plaintiff was 
entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Option agreement 
however, evidence of attorney's fees was not presented at 
trial and Plaintiff's motion made at the beginning of Plain-
tiff's closing argument, to be pennitted to offer evidence of 
attorney's fees, was denied (see Conclusions of Law R.108). 
The Court was cognizant of the fact that the Plaintiff was en-
titled to be awarded attorney's fees, but the Court would not 
indulge Plaintiff's counsel's mistake in resting his case 
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(illllllediately followed by Defendant's resting) and then 
rememberingat the outset of his closing argument, that he 
had forgotten his last witness, namely himself, to provide 
evidence of attorney's fees. It was only 4:00 o'clock 
in the afternoon and the Court reporter, parties, and 
respective counsel were all present in Court when Plaintiff's 
counsel requested that the Court allow him to reopen his 
case for just a few minutes to put on evidence of attorney's 
fees. He advised the Court that he had an affidavit of 
attorney's fees itemizing the services that were performed 
and asked if the Court would permit him to offer it and to 
testify only on the total time and value so that Plaintiff 
could be awarded fees, but the Court denied this motion. 
It is difficult to understand how the Defendant's case 
could have been prejudiced by allowing the Plaintiff to put 
on evidence of attorney's fees since there was more than 
ample time remaining before the end of the day for counsel for 
both sides to conclude their closing arguments. 
It would seem understandable that after examining many 
witnesses and in the midst of the pressure of trial that 
Plaintiff's counsel, not being assisted, could make a technical 
mistake. However, for the Court to refuse to permit him to 
put on such evidence where no prejudice could result to the 
Defendant, other than to escape from paying any award of 
attorney's fees, appears inconsistent with the intent of the 
modern Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The manifest intent was 
to liberalize procedure to accomplish a more just and equit-
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able result and to avoid the technicalities and nice form-
alities that were sometimes an impediment in the past. 
A particular example of this is Rule 61. "Harmless 
Error" which in substance requires that no errors or other 
technical defects or irregularities should disturb a judg-
ment or order or serve as grounds for a new trial unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the Court inconsisten: 
with substantial justice. Rule 61. ends by saying, 
The court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
It would seem that this last sentence means that an attorney 
should have no reason to complain about an error or defect 
that does not prejudice the substantial rights of the part~1 
It should be equally true that the Court should disregard 
the technical procedural defect by Plaintiff's counsel in 
resting his case before remembering that he had failed to 
put on evidence of attorney's fees, which did not prejudice 
Defendant, but did affect the substantial rights of the 
Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is respectfully 
submitted that Plaintiff is entitled to damages measured 
by the fair market value of Defendant's property considered 
with the enhancement in value attributable to Plaintiffs 
right to purchase the adjoining DeGooyer's property and pro-
vide necessary access to the Defendant's property. The 
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value of 8efendant's property when considered with the 
benefit of an access was $114,600.00 and after deducting 
the unpaid balance on the Option price in the amount of 
$73,000.00, Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount 
of $36,600.00. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to special damages in the 
amount of $1,115.54 representing the out of pocket costs 
and expenses paid for preliminary engineering and plans 
and the deposit lost upon the DeGooyer purchase transaction 
all of which costs and expenses were rendered valueless to 
Plaintiff by Defendants breach. 
Plaintiff is further entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees in an amount to be determined by the trial 
court in accordance with the terms of the Option agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February, 1980. 
BURBIDGE, MABEY & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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